Making Sense of China’s Great Quantum Leap Forward

Amidst the recently ignited global AI race between China and the United States (US), another frontier of technological rivalry is quietly emerging: quantum (Moscioni, 2025a). Specifically, quantum information science and technology (QIST) encompass quantum computing, communication, and sensing, which are all fields that harness the unique properties of quantum physics to process, transmit, and detect information in ways that exceed classical digital technologies (University of Waterloo, 2025). These advances promise breakthroughs in areas like secure communications, ultra-fast computation, and precision measurement, ultimately potentially revolutionizing economic systems, global cybersecurity, militaries, and scientific research at a fundamental and architectural level (Boger, 2024).

As with AI, states realize that the stakes of technological leadership in QIST are major in both economic and geopolitical dimensions. Therefore, QIST is no longer confined to merely national innovation agendas, but instead entangled with the economic and political dynamics playing on the world stage. Control over quantum capabilities confer strategic advantages, ranging from dominance in future cyberwarfare to innovation ecosystems with, for instance, quantum enhanced computing architectures.

In this way, with a 15.3 USD commitment in public funds, China aims to lead in global QIST R&D with the highest amount of national investments (McKinsey, 2024). This comes as China has also prioritized quantum control as a core research area in its science and technology plans since 2006, well ahead of many other technologically advanced nations (Hmaidi & Groenewegen-Lau, 2024). Through these efforts, the Asian superpower is aiming to shape the future direction, norms, and adoption of QIST. This essay explores and analyzes how China leverages its strategic investments, policy planning, and international engagement to influence the global governance landscape of QIST, while also recognizing the challenges it faces. Therefore, it asks: How is China’s role in the global governance of QIST evolving, and what are emerging challenges?

The next section outlines China’s current and planned commitments to QIST. Then the implications for QIST governance are discussed, subsequently moving to a discussion of the challenges and tensions of Chinese quantum development, before the essay ends with the conclusion.

Domestic QIST Developments

China’s current QIST landscape is characterized by rapid, state-guided advances in mainly the fields of quantum computing and communication (Hmaidi & Groenewegen-Lau, 2024). One of the first of these efforts is the National Lab for Quantum Information Sciences (NLQIS), established in 2017 with over CNY 7 billion (approximately USD 1 billion) in initial funding. This lab expands and anchors China’s 2016 long-term megaproject on QIST and coordinates sub-projects spanning core research to prototype development to achieve major breakthroughs by 2030 (Kania, 2018). Furthermore, Chinese researchers have consistently broken national records in both the scale and performance of qubits (the fundamental units of quantum computing, like bits in classical computers). For instance, in 2024, Hefei based QIST company Origin Quantum presented the 72-qubit superconducting computer “Origin Wukong”, an achievement as promised in China’s 2020 14th Five-Year Plan. Soon, in early 2025, the Chinese Tianyan-504 superconducting chip surpassed 500 qubits while matching international standards for qubit lifetime and readout fidelity, showcasing further rapid advancement in QIST (Hmaidi & Groenewegen-Lau, 2024; Moscioni, 2025a). In general, quantum communication remains China’s strongest QIST field. Since the 2016 launch of the Micius satellite, the world’s first quantum communications spacecraft, China has also built a 12,000 km quantum key distribution (QKD) infrastructure linking Beijing, Shanghai, Hefei, and other major cities (Hmaidi & Groenewegen-Lau, 2024).

Additionally, on the scholarly front, China has become a leader in quantum-related research publications annually, especially since the establishment of the 2022 National Standardization Development Program (NSDP) by the government that laid out specific steps to advance China’s global technological standard-setting (Omaar & Makaryan, 2024). As shown in Figure 1, China’s share of global research output already trumps those of the US, while it is slowly catching up on other metrics. This scholarly surge shows the dual academic and practical focus of China’s “whole-of-nation” system wherein, as according to Groenewegen-Lau (2024), public research institutes perform foundational science that feeds directly into state-led industrial applications. Moreover, with more than 6000 patent families, China dominates the total number of QIST patents filed, topping the US that has around 3500 (Omaar & Makaryan, 2024).

Figure 1. Comparing research output and performance metrics in quantum technologies. Source: Omaar and Makaryan (2024).

Now with the 15th Five Year Plan for 2026-2030, the Chinese government aims to further expand quantum research hubs, with the goal of commercializing practical and economically feasible QIST application soon by 2028. The state also seeks to widely implement quantum encryption systems to safeguard digital infrastructure. Thus, QIST will be at the core of the next phase of Chinese development (Simon & Applebaum, 2025). Ultimately, ambitious initiatives like QIST will continue to be government-driven in China as the state seeks to leverage novel technological advances to strengthen its economic foundations and address ongoing challenges and external pressures (Ye, 2020).

Shaping Global QIST Governance

With the nation-wide and priority focus, Chinese influence permeates the global QIST development landscape and quantum governance. First, Chinese researchers and firms have long been organizing cross-border R&D initiatives and techno-scientific research collaborations (Schneider-Petsinger et al., 2019). For example, in 2017, Chinese and Austrian researchers from their country’s respective Academy of Sciences successfully conducted the world’s first quantum secured intercontinental call. This milestone, facilitated by China’s Micius quantum satellite, showcases Beijing’s willingness to cooperate with Western partners to push quantum frontiers.

Later, in 2024, Chinese and South African researchers successfully created an ultra-secure quantum key distribution link between Beijing and South Africa, which is the first of its kind in the southern hemisphere (Swayne, 2025a). Moreover, China and Russia have intensified cooperation. In January 2024 scientists from both countries announced a 38.000 km quantum communication line linking Moscow to Urumqi in western China (Howell, 2024). Developments like these also indicate to how China is slowly forming a secure BRICS-wide quantum infrastructure and knowledge exchange spanning Russia, China, India, South Africa and beyond.

Second, China is growing its “digital infrastructure” portfolio abroad, which includes quantum computing projects enhancing existing digital infrastructures (Strange, 2023). By building cutting-edge quantum infrastructure at home and offering it abroad, China can set de facto standards through implementation, especially when concerning quantum architecture on which new advanced technologies will depend on. Indeed, these exports and technology transfers allow China’s technical standards to advance. States that adopt Chinese QIST solutions may, knowingly or not, become tied to the standards, settings, and interfaces as defined by Chinese engineers and developers. Internationally, Chinese experts writing draft standards in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Telecommunication Union (ITU) ensure that the technical specifics of next-generation quantum networks align with China’s own implementations (Exovera, 2022). This combination of standard-setting and technology export means that China not only co-writes the rulebook but also supply the equipment that enacts those rules. For instance, foreign firms may become “lock-in” with Chinese quantum infrastructures such that it becomes financially unfeasible to switch, especially with such a complex technology that is not easily replaceable nor substitutable when integrated (Exovera, 2022). Nations not only become technologically dependent, but also economically as the commercialization of QIST grows.

Third, quantum infrastructure investments abroad can generate “elite influence” and soft power as they create political favors and showcase generosity and development capabilities (Strange, 2023). Chinese officials and state media consistently frame the country’s quantum strides as peaceful, cooperative advancements is required for such a complex technology and will benefit the world, as a “win-win” situation (Xinhua, 2025). Such messaging frame China’s quantum innovations as public goods that strengthen cybersecurity for all, subtly garnering international goodwill and acceptance of Chinese-led initiatives. Additionally, through R&D partnerships, China engages in state-to-state quantum diplomacy to build political goodwill and support for its leadership in QIST. In this way, it acts on the novel opportunity of QIST which no other state has significantly developed yet, guiding the direction of global technological innovation into a new field wherein it can lead, instead of having to compete against historically established powerhouses (Moscioni, 2025b).

In general, Chinese QIST researchers, engineers, and policymakers are increasingly intertwined and leading in the global QIST innovation landscape, simultaneously not only creating influential standards and norms but also international knowledge, technology, and economic dependencies. Thus, aligning with Moore (2022), it becomes increasingly crucial for states to collaborate with China to regulate and shape QIST innovation. Especially if states consider the risks and dangers posed by the technology, either inherently or through political and military might. Simultaneously, this collaboration is what drives Chinese QIST development, influence, and power.

Emerging Challenges and Tensions

China’s rapid progress in technology, including QIST, create not only new governance dynamics, but also geopolitical challenges and exacerbates existing tensions (Schneider-Petsinger et al., 2019). Most notably, Chinese QIST development is inevitably intertwined with military applications and risks. State ministries and the People’s Liberation Army coordinate to prioritize quantum sensing, communications, and computing projects with explicit military utility, as these technologies can significantly revolutionize military operations, logistics, and cyberwarfare, like by rapidly discovering war-enhancing materials or cracking foreign nation supercomputers. For example, in April 2025, Chinese researchers successfully demonstrated a drone‐mounted quantum sensor capable of detecting submarines with high sensitivity, which overcomes blind spots that plague traditional acoustic or magnetic detectors (Swayne, 2025b). In this way, it threatens to erode stealth advantages once held by friendly undersea vessels. On the other hand, US military leaders have argued that there exist vulnerabilities in current communications networks. There have for instance been calls for undecryptable quantum links to safeguard logistics and battlefield transmissions (Baker, 2025). These developments show the growing worries and imperatives between great powers to rapidly create both quantum advanced but also quantum-resilient systems, even if the technology is still relatively in its infancy.

Furthermore, in response to national-security fears, the US has been known to impose trade restrictions on Chinese technologies, with no exception to QIST. For example, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security published an interim rule in 2024 adding quantum computers, cryogenic components, materials, software, and related technology to the Export Administration Regulations, which subjects them to strict licensing requirements (Hurst, 2025). Adding to these controls, the Treasury Department also finalized a rule in 2025 that bars US persons to invest in Chinese entities developing quantum computers and quantum networks intended for secure communications, among others (Taylor, 2024). All togehter, these measures aim to deny China both the hardware and capital required to speed up its quantum military and, as a consequence, its QIST development. Ultimately, both Chinese and foreign researchers and firms now face a long list of rules that undermine collaboration, inflate costs, and discourage multinational projects.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this essay asked: How is China’s role in the global governance of QIST evolving, and what are emerging challenges? China’s decades-long, state-led push in quantum is reshaping global innovation and governance. Significant public funding, a whole-of-nation R&D model, and targeted foreign partnerships and investments allows China to set the pace and guide the development of QIST, most notably in quantum communications. Exporting and implementing crucial infrastructure abroad while drafting international standards combines technology influence with norm-setting, which helps China lock in early adopters to Chinese architectures. However, civil-military fusion and supply-chain frictions also fosters mistrust. It, for instance, triggers US-led export and investment curbs that hinder collaboration and raise costs. Ultimately, whether QIST becomes a shared platform, or a tense arena depends on China’s ability to reassure partners, embed transparent safeguards and adapt to tightening external constraints. Looking ahead, China is expected to double down on scaling its quantum systems, broaden global quantum networks, and fold quantum security into an international infrastructure deal. Its success will depend on the ability of the Chinese government to balance openness with security imperatives with significant and responsible innovation.

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